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| 考虑主导权的零售商双渠道供应链定价策略 |
| Pricing strategy of retailer dual-channel supply chain considering predominant power |
| 投稿时间：2017-05-03 |
| DOI： |
| 中文关键词: 供应链管理 定价策略 双渠道供应链 零售商 制造商 主导权 Stackelberg模型 |
| 英文关键词: supply chain management pricing strategy dual-channel supply chain retailer manufacturer predominant power Stackelberg model |
| 基金项目:国家自然科学基金青年科学基金项目(71601150)；湖北省教育厅人文社会科学研究项目(2013G246). |
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| 中文摘要: |
| 本文研究竞争环境下不同主导权结构中零售商双渠道供应链定价问题。分别建立制造商主导型和零售商主导型的Stackelberg模型,并对最优决策进行对比分析。研究表明,不管是制造商还是零售商主导供应链,零售商双渠道价格和供应链的总利润均保持不变,但批发价格、制造商和零售商各自的利润与主导权密切相关,即拥有主导权的一方将使批发价格有利于自己,从而使其利润最大化。此外,最优双渠道价格和最大利润随市场需求量的增加而提高,随价格弹性系数的增大而减少；随着线下市场份额的增加,最优线下价格逐渐升高,而最优线上价格的变化刚好相反。 |
| 英文摘要: |
| This paper investigates the pricing of retailer dual-channel supply chain with different dominance structures in a competitive environment. Manufacturer-leading and retailer-leading Stackelberg models are developed respectively, and the optimal decisions are analyzed and compared. The results show that whether the manufacturer or the retailer is dominant, the dual-channel prices and the whole supply chain’s profit remain unchanged. But wholesale price and profits of the manufacturer and the retailer are closely related to the predominant power, i.e. the leader will make the wholesale price most beneficial to himself and maximize his profit. In addition, the optimal dual-channel prices and the maximum profit go up with the increase of market demand, but go down with the increase of price elastic coefficient. With the growth of offline market share, the optimal offline price rises and the optimal online price changes inversely. |
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